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1A B S T R A C T
1Long-run data on changes in the share of top income earners in 
South Africa shows that the incomes of the top income groups 
have become less concentrated for most of the twentieth century, 
but have become more skewed in the last decade. Compared to a 
selection of developing and developed countries, the tax burden 
is already at a high level, which constrains further exploitation of 
the tax system for revenue purposes. The purpose of this study is 
to consider the implications of taxing the rich in South Africa more 
heavily to address large (taxable) income inequality. It is estimated 
that a 10 per cent increase in the top marginal tax rate would result 
in taxable income ranging from gains of approximately R2 billion 
to losses of R340 million. Although these results are tentative, they 
show that taxing the rich at higher rates may not produce the revenue 
windfall expected. The efficiency loss associated with an increase of 
one Rand in revenues is estimated at between R0.39 and R3.16. An 
alternative to taxing the rich at higher marginal tax rates could be 
reducing tax expenditures that are disproportionately utilised by the 
rich and taxing the process whereby the rich become rich.
2Key words: taxable income, taxing the rich, top income shares, inverted Pareto-Lorenz 
coefficients, elasticity of taxable income, marginal excess burden, tax 
expenditures
Introduction
1The appropriate rates of income tax for rich households and individuals have become 
a popular policy issue in the last two decades. The debate was raised in October 
1997 at a conference held in Ann Arbor by the Office of Tax Policy Research of 
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the University of Michigan Business School entitled, ‘“Does Atlas Shrug?” The 
Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich’ (see Slemrod 2000). Recently the debate 
was further invigorated by a New York Times article in which billionaire investor 
Warren Buffett alleged that the super-rich do not pay enough taxes (Timeslive 2010). 
US president Barack Obama is also calling for “millionaires and billionaires” to 
“pay their fair share”, and the new French president is arguing for a 75% tax rate 
on household incomes above $1.3 million (Economist 2012a, 2012b). The call for a 
“millionaire surcharge”, as proposed by Democratic Senate leader Harry Reid, led 
Dalmia (2011) to remark that, “For Democrats, millionaires are the new Gypsies – a 
minority whom it is perfectly acceptable to persecute because its wealth is ill-gotten, 
not the product of hard work.” In the United Kingdom (UK), it was announced in 
2008 that a 45 per cent tax on incomes above £150 000 would take effect in 2011, but 
this rate was increased to 50 per cent and the date brought forward to April 2010 
(Brewer, Browne & Johnson 2012: 181).
Interest in the taxation of the rich is not just about the popularity of the rates 
debate. Tanzi (2004: 540) notes that since high-income earners generally benefit 
most from globalisation, the personal income tax system is ideally suited to capture 
revenue from these income groups for redistributive purposes. Atkinson (2007: 19–
25) concludes that considering the command the rich have over resources and people 
(power) as well as the recent global rise in inequality at the top makes the study of the 
income distribution at the top important rather than just sensationalist.
Top income earners may account for a small percentage of the population but a 
large share of total income and taxes paid. It is obvious that the rich are important 
to economic development for that is where the concentration of money is as well 
as wealth, net savings and talent (see Slemrod 1998: 6–7; Matthews 2011: 18–23). 
A progressive income tax system taxes success and may discourage entrepreneurial 
entry and innovation (see Gentry & Hubbard 2004). The very rich receive relatively 
more compensation in the form of cash, bonuses, share options and capital income 
than other income groups, which makes them more responsive to demand conditions 
and the business cycle. It also enables them to shift the form in which they receive 
income in the short run (see Goolsbee 1998). The savings behaviour of the rich and 
very rich is very different from the rest of the population and cannot be explained 
by models relying only on wealth accumulation aimed at future consumption or 
for their heirs. Wealth accumulation may be intrinsically desirable (Carroll 1998). 
The hours of work of high-income taxpayers are sometimes assumed to be more 
responsive to high marginal tax rates. The evidence is inconclusive, but suggests that 
high-income taxpayers (in particular men) may be more involved in tax planning in 
response to marginal tax rates (see Moffitt & Wilhelm 1998; Meghir & Phillips 2010; 
Gruber & Saez 2002).
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Who are the rich? For the purposes of this study, the group with the top 1 per 
cent income share is denoted as ‘the rich’ and the top 0.1 per cent as ‘the very rich’. 
Further classification is of semantic value, but the top 0.01 could be called ‘the super-
rich’. The income measure used is also relevant. In this study the gross income share 
of the top 1 per cent and the ‘taxable’ income share of the top 1 per cent will be 
used. It should be noted that being part of the top 1 per cent does not necessarily 
mean being rich (see Atkinson, Piketty & Saez 2011: 52). Relative income levels differ 
between countries, and there are also huge differences within the top 1 per cent.
South Africa is characterised by large income and taxable income inequality. In 
2010 the taxable income share of the top 10 per cent was 47 per cent; that of the 
top 1 per cent of taxpayers was approximately 18 per cent (calculated from National 
Treasury & SARS 2011: A.2.1.1). Although the focus of this study is the top 1 per cent, 
the income composition of the top 10 per cent can be indicative of their characteristics. 
According to the Income and Expenditure Survey of StatsSA (2008: Table 3.8), the 
upper-income decile earns most of their income from salaries and wages (66.9 per 
cent). Income from capital is in the order of 1.6 per cent but, as expected, when 
compared to other income groups constitutes the highest share (double the next-
highest share earned by decile 8. The upper-income group also earns the most from 
self-employment and business income. Using three different data sets, Leibbrandt, 
Woolard, Finn and Argent (2010: Table A.3.5) showed that the share of capital 
income of the top decile was 4.42 in 1993, 5.51 in 2000 and 11.0 per cent in 2008. This 
clearly indicates a rising share.
Public debt levels in South Africa are low compared to other countries affected by 
the global financial meltdown, and fortunately finding additional sources to decrease 
high debt levels is not a major objective for the fiscal authorities. However, the tax 
authorities are nevertheless faced with ever-increasing economic, social and political 
demands requiring higher public expenditures. To meet these redistributional and 
development needs, existing tax sources will have to be used more efficiently and 
equitably. Avenues for new or alternative tax sources also need to be explored. One 
option to change the distribution at the top and to obtain revenue for redistributive 
purposes is to tax the rich more.
Because of the economic importance of the rich, it is imperative to study how 
sensitive their behaviour is to changes in income and what the implications are for 
public policy and taxation in particular. However, it is first necessary to know what 
has happened to top incomes. Long-run data on changes in the high-income group’s 
share of total incomes recently became available for a large number of countries 
including South Africa. The results from these data series will be discussed in the 
section on the distribution of top incomes. The question is how much scope there 
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is for additional tax revenue by changing the tax contribution of this group. This 
question is approached in two steps. Consideration is first given to the overall level 
of the tax burden and the share of personal income tax in particular. This is done 
in the section on tax revenue levels and composition. As described in the section on 
redistribution from the rich, the next step is to determine the potential for higher 
tax revenue by taxing the rich at higher marginal rates. Taxing the rich will have 
efficiency implications, however, which are also addressed in this section. The 
alternatives to taxing the rich at higher marginal tax rates are briefly reviewed in the 
section on alternatives to taxing the rich at higher rates.
The distribution of top incomes
1The study of top incomes of Continental European and English-Speaking Countries 
during the twentieth century has been the aim of a project that culminated in a 
first volume edited by Atkinson and Piketty (2007). A second volume dealt with 
top incomes from a global perspective (Atkinson & Piketty 2010). These studies 
provide a data series and technical information for a number of countries that make 
comparisons possible (although the data sets are not fully homogeneous across 
countries). Instead of using household survey data, tabulated tax data are used to 
estimate top income shares by using Pareto interpolations and control totals for 
population and income – see Atkinson and Piketty (2007: 26–34) and Atkinson et al. 
(2011: 12–40) for a discussion of measurement issues and possible limitations. The 
data from these studies are also captured and integrated in the World Top Incomes 
Database compiled and maintained by the Paris School of Economics (Alvaredo, 
Atkinson, Piketty & Saez 2012). Using the same methodology, Alvaredo and Atkinson 
(2010) published a discussion paper under the auspices of the Centre for Economic 
Policy Research (CEPR) entitled ‘Colonial rule, Apartheid and natural resources: 
top incomes in South Africa, 1903–2007’. Three data sets are estimated for South 
Africa covering top income shares for a period of more than 100 years.
Alvaredo and Atkinson (2010: 14) summarise their evidence on the top incomes 
in South Africa as follows: 
• Incomes are highly unequally distributed. In 2005 the share of the top 10 per cent 
in gross income was in excess of 44 per cent, that of the top 5 per cent over a third 
and that of the top 1 per cent above 15 per cent (see Figure 1).
• There has been a fall in top income shares over much of the twentieth century, 
with the exception of an upward spike during the years of the Great Depression 
and the Second World War (see Figure 1). 
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• There is an upward trend in top income shares in the present century (2002–
2007). Note that the data for this period are not entirely comparable with previous 
periods since capital gains have been included in the later series. The impact of 
capital gains on the top 1 per cent is often significant and may be observed as an 
increase in inequality (see Atkinson et al. 2011: 35–36).
• Incomes within the top groups have become less concentrated in the twentieth 
century. This is evident from the inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficients – the share 
of the top 0.1 per cent within the share of the top 1 per cent (see Alvaredo & 
Atkinson 2010: Table A.5B and A.5C). Higher coefficients imply more inequality 
(or concentration) of income within the distribution. The coefficients were around 
2.09 in 1914, 1.66 in 1954 and 1.52 in 1993. From 2002 to 2007, concentration 















































































Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% Top 0.5% Top 0.10
Notes: a. Data for 1914–1939 exclude dividend income.
 b. Data for 1944–2007 include dividend income.
 c. Tax statistics for the years 1994–2001 are not available.
Sources: Alvaredo & Atkinson (2010: Table A.5A); Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty & Saez (2012)




Table 1:  Top 1 per cent income share in Argentina, Australia, India, Indonesia, 
Mauritius, New Zealand and South Africa (1980–2007)





1980 4.79 4.78 6.72 5.65 10.89
1981 4.61 4.39 6.25 5.5 11.35
1982 4.67 4.51 7.17 5.8 5.49 12
1983 4.68 6.46 5.39 5.68 11.34
1984 4.75 6.39 4.99 5.6 11.3
1985 5.02 8.24 4.97 5.51 10.64
1986 5.39 8.64 4.95 4.88 10.35
1987 6.67 8.12 7.99 4.92 5.48 8.78
1988 8.41 8.52 4.23 5.35 9.88
1989 6.43 8.19 4.76 6.59
1990 6.34 7.42 8.05 4.93 8.21 9.85
1991 6.41 7.12 5.01 7.96 10.54
1992 6.55 6.96 8.4 10.56
1993 6.96 8.53 9.1 4.54 8.76 10.27
1994 7.13 8.09 4.69 9
1995 7.23 8.67 4.62 8.98
1996 7.24 8.72 9.69 4.52 8.92
1997 12.39 7.81 10.7 4.5 9.16
1998 12.57 7.84 8.95 12.42 4.75 10.21
1999 13.53 8.84 8.95 13.65 13.77
2000 14.34 9.03 13.82 8.34
2001 12.91 8.31 15.52 4.85 8.72
2002 15.53 8.79 10.47 3.9 8.78 14.58
2003 16.85 9.18 9.76 5.13 9.33 14.84
2004 16.75 8.89 8.46 5.28 9.93 15.05
2005 9.12 4.98 9.48 15.5
2006 10.06 6.05 8.89 15.77
2007 9.84 6.68 8.54 16.25
Source: Alvaredo et al. (2012)
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In an attempt to explain the evolution of top income shares in South Africa, 
Alvaredo and Atkinson (2010) compare South Africa to Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand (former Anglo-Saxon colonies and natural resource-rich countries), the 
United Kingdom and the United States (USA). This enables them to conclude that 
the top shares in South Africa did fall up to 1980, but not at a faster rate than in the 
other dominions, and today South Africa ranks with the most unequal Anglo-Saxon 
countries. Alvaredo et al. (2012) compiled data series for other developing countries 
such as India, Argentina, Mauritius and Indonesia, but the series are incomplete for 
the full period. It appears that top real income shares in these countries also declined 
until the early 1980s. In the last two decades, Argentina, India, Mauritius and South 
Africa experienced a growing trend in top income shares (see Table 1). Again the 
high top income share in South Africa compared to these countries is noticeable, 
with only Argentina exceeding the South African share between 2000 and 2004. 
It has already been mentioned that incomes within the top groups have become 
less concentrated in the twentieth century. However, when the distribution within the 
top 1 per cent since 1980 is viewed, the inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficients (calculated 
from the shares of the top 0.1 and 1 per cent) show that in all the countries there is 
growing concentration. Compared to this selection of countries, the concentration 
within the top 1 per cent of income in South Africa does not rank particularly high. 
For example, in 2004 the coefficient for South Africa was 1.86 compared to values of 
2.65, 2.10 and 2.00 for Argentina, New Zealand and Mauritius respectively.
 Using income tax data for the period 1956 to 1987, Alvaredo and Atkinson 
(2010) were also able to examine the racial composition of the top income groups in 
South Africa. Their conclusion that there was little change in the degree of white 
dominance does not come as a surprise (whites constituted 96.7 per cent of the top 
1 per cent in 1987). Unfortunately income tax data on a racial basis are not available 
for later periods, but it is noticeable that when South Africa is compared to Australia 
and New Zealand, the share of the top 5 per cent of the white population was 11.3 per 
cent in 1985 compared to 15.6 per cent in Australia and 16.7 per cent in New Zealand 
(Alvaredo & Atkinson 2010: 17). 
The highly skewed distribution is confirmed by income expenditure survey data 
for 2005/06 (see StatsSA 2008). The top 10 per cent of households account for 51 per 
cent of total household income. The white population accounted for 72.7 per cent 
of total household income in decile 10. A comparison of changes in the mean real 
income per capita according to deciles reveals above-average increases in deciles 1, 2, 
3 and 10 between 2000 and 2005/06. Using national survey data, Leibbrandt et al. 























































































Argentina Australia India Mauritius New Zealand South Africa
Notes: Coefficients are estimated from the top 0.1 per cent share within the top 1 per cent share.
Sources: Alvaredo et al. (2012); Alvaredo & Atkinson (2010: Tables A.5B and A.5C)
Figure 2:  Inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficient in Argentina, Australia, India, Mauritius, New 
Zealand and South Africa (1980–2007) 
1At the same time, rising inequality within the black group is observed (see Leibbrandt 
et al. 2010: 10; Van der Berg & Louw 2003). As to why the racial composition of the 
top 10 per cent is changing, one can only speculate. Factors that may explain why 
the share of the black population is on the rise are black economic empowerment, 
white emigration, employment equity and the pay premium that black professionals 
attract. 
Tax revenue levels and composition
1The imperative to reduce income inequalities and poverty levels in South Africa 
requires not less but more (and more effective) public expenditure and probably higher 
tax levels if economic growth does not accelerate over the medium to longer terms. 
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Tax levels and the composition of taxes invariably differ between countries because 
their public choice history, development stage, size of the tax base and sometimes 
endowment (for example, natural resources) vary greatly. There are nonetheless 
patterns that emerge, and simple inter-country comparisons enable benchmarks to 
be set for tax reform and policy options. The scope for additional tax revenue can 
be put in context by first comparing the total tax burden in South Africa to that of 
comparable countries. Next the structure or composition of the tax system can be 
considered to determine the relative importance and potential of personal income 
tax as a revenue source.
Figure 3 shows the average level of tax revenue of central government as a percentage 
of GDP for 2007 for a selected group of countries.1 South Africa (SA) is a member of 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU). The average tax burden of SADC countries is 25.2 per 
cent of GDP. Oil revenue in Angola is the main source of tax revenue, contributing 
41.2 per cent to GDP; other taxes add only 7.4 per cent. In the SACU grouping, 
the tax revenues of some of the partner countries are disproportionately high when 
SACU payments are included in their total tax revenue. In the case of Lesotho and 
Swaziland, for example, SACU payments constitute 35.0 per cent and 25.3 per cent of 
their respective GDPs. If SACU and Angola are excluded from the SADC sample, tax 
revenue amounts to only 17.7 per cent of GDP. The level of taxation in South Africa 
(26.3 per cent of GDP) is thus much higher than that of its SADC partners. When 
the tax burden of a more diverse group of 13 developing countries (least developed 
countries – LDCs) (21.3 per cent of GDP) is compared to the overall tax burden in 
South Africa, a similar picture emerges – South Africa exhibits a higher tax burden 
than most of the sample of developing countries.
When South Africa is compared to a selected group of 13 developed countries 
(DCs), their unweighted average tax burden (excluding social security contributions) 
of 21.6 per cent of GDP is again less than that of South Africa. However, once social 
security contributions (SSC) are factored in, the South African tax level is much 
lower than the DC average of 31.7 per cent of GDP. It could be argued, however, that 
only the SSC contributed by employers should be included in the tax burden. The 
share contributed by individuals could be regarded as a form of private retirement 
provision. In South Africa, retirement contributions are at present voluntary and 
therefore not comparable to SSC. If mandatory social security contributions that are 
under consideration by government are to be introduced in future years, it would 













































Notes: a.  Sample of 13 LDCs (Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Paraguay, Egypt, Mauritius, Morocco, 
Seychelles, Thailand, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland)
 b.  Sample of 13 DCs (USA, Canada, UK, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Australia and New Zealand)
Sources:  Compiled from IMF (2008, 2010)
Figure 3: Tax revenue (central government) as a percentage of GDP (2007)
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A cross-country comparison of tax systems indicates that there are vast differences 
in the composition of tax revenues between countries. Again, as each country’s tax 
system has been shaped over time by many forces, care should be exercised not to base 
tax reforms on international comparisons alone. Nevertheless, interesting patterns do 
emerge when countries are grouped together according to their level of economic 
development. 








1 Taxes on income, profits and capital gains 30.2 51.8 54.7
 1.1 Payable by individuals 12.8 35.7 27.9
 1.2 Payable by corporations and other enterprises 17.8 15.4 26.9
2 Taxes on payroll and workforce 0.4 1.5 1.0
3 Taxes on property 5.7 8.1 5.5
4 Taxes on goods and services 52.5 37.1 34.3
 4.1 General taxes (e.g. value-added taxes) 34.1 23.0 24.8
 4.2 Excises 14.7 7.9 8.3
5 Taxes on international trade and transactions 10.9 0.6 4.3
Total tax revenue (excluding social security 
contributions)
100.0 100.0 100.0
Sum of personal income tax and social security 
contributions as % of total tax revenue (including social 
security contributions)
24.7 51.9 29.3
Notes: a.  Sample of 13 LDCs (four in Latin America, four in Africa, one in Asia and four in Eastern 
Europe)
 b. Sample of 13 DCs
 Percentages are unweighted averages.
Source: Compiled from IMF (2008)
1
From Table 2 it can be observed that taxes on income, profits and capital gains 
constitute the most important sources of tax revenue in DCs (51.8 per cent), whereas 
taxes on goods and services are the major sources of revenue in developing countries 
(52.5 per cent). In developed countries, income tax on individuals (35.7 per cent) is 
more than double the share of income tax on companies (15.4 per cent). In developing 
countries, company tax is an easier source to exploit than personal income tax, and 
consequently the share of company tax far exceeds that of tax payable by individuals. 
Trade taxes are insignificant sources of tax revenue in developed countries (0.6 per 
cent) compared to developing countries (10.9 per cent).
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When South Africa’s tax composition is compared to the sample of DCs and 
LDCs, the most striking observation is that in most respects the South African 
structure is similar to that of DCs. The South African personal income share 
generally exceeds that of DCs (in eight out of the 13 countries). However, once 
social security contributions are included in total tax revenue, the sample of DCs, 
without exception, have higher income tax shares payable by individuals. It should 
be recognised that social security contributions are negligible in South Africa, since 
most individuals provide for old age through voluntary private retirement schemes. 
Furthermore, South Africa has a large non-contributory, means-tested old-age grant 
system that caters for lower-income elderly people. Regarding corporate tax, South 
Africa is in a different league. Company tax is a significant source – only Norway 
has a higher share – and makes a contribution equal to that of personal income tax.
Compared to the sample of 13 developing countries, South Africa’s share of 
personal income tax equalled that of Hungary and exceeded that of the remaining 
12 countries. When social security contributions are added to tax revenue, a slightly 
different picture emerges. Five LDCs have personal income tax plus social security 
contributions as a percentage of total revenue that exceed levels in South Africa. 
Four of these countries are from central and eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Poland and Hungary) and this deviation is to some extent explained by 
their centrally planned past. In respect of company tax, South Africa again differs 
from the developing country sample with its high share – only Thailand and Egypt 
had company tax shares exceeding that of South Africa.
In an earlier study, Steenekamp (2007) compared South Africa’s revenue 
performance to that of a number of other developing economies. A representative tax 
system approach was used to compile a tax effort index. The results for the financial 
years 2000/01 to 2004/05 indicate that the South African revenue authorities are 
exploiting the available tax sources very well and outperform comparable countries. 
When different tax classes are considered, it appears that South Africa uses personal 
income taxes and corporate income tax intensively. In comparative terms, the total 
tax burden appears to be too high. The implications for tax policy are lower personal 
income taxation and corporate taxation (Steenekamp 2007: 14).
Redistribution from the rich
Income inequality and taxation
1One of the reasons for the global increase in the income share of the top 1 per cent 
over the last decade is declining top marginal tax rates. In line with international 
Taxing the rich at higher rates in South Africa
13 
trends, in South Africa marginal tax rates applicable to the rich were similarly 
reduced in steps from a high of 75.5 per cent in 1948 to the current level of 40 per cent. 
Using a microsimulation model, Van Heerden and Schoeman (2010: 13) confirm 
that taxpayers at the higher end of the income tax scale benefited more from tax 
reforms in recent years. At the same time, the redistributive effect of the budgetary 
process (for example, increased social spending and higher user charges) must be 
acknowledged. However, the empirical evidence on progressivity and the impact 
of taxation in particular on redistribution in South Africa since 1994 is not very 
encouraging (see Nyamongo & Schoeman 2007, Van der Berg 2009; StatsSA 2008). 
Steenekamp (2012) employs three measures to determine how adjustments to the 
personal income tax rate and thresholds affected progressivity. It is concluded that 
between 1997 and 2000, personal income tax first became less progressive and then 
increased marginally in progressivity between 2000 and 2009 (Steenekamp 2012). 
This begs the question of whether targeting the rich would have the desired outcome 
for redistributive tax policy.
Responsiveness of the very rich to tax changes
1Taxes (and changes in tax rates) affect economic behaviour. Responses also differ 
within different income groups. For example, using evidence from US tax data, share 
analysis shows that the reported incomes of the top 1 percentile are responsive to 
marginal tax rates, whereas those of the next 9 percentiles are not over the short run or 
long run (Saez, Slemrod & Giertz 2012: 19). The ways in which rich individuals react 
to higher tax rates are numerous and include (Brewer et al. 2012: 183; Feldstein 2008, 
Keen, Kim & Varsano 2008): working fewer hours, reducing work effort, retiring 
earlier from paid work, choosing a lower-paying career, change the mix between cash 
wages and fringe benefits, shifting compensation between corporate and personal 
income, evasion and emigrating. All these behavioural responses are important, 
because they impact on tax revenue and economic efficiency (the deadweight loss). 
In principle, the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) can capture all of these responses.
Estimating the revenue and efficiency implications of changes in the marginal 
tax rate paid by the top 1 per cent will be done in a stepped approach. First the 
basic model and its limitations are presented, followed by a description of the data. 
Thereafter the possible consequences for revenue, the excess burden and the Pareto 




1The conceptual framework for the basic model is described in Saez (2004: 11–15) 
and Saez et al. (2012: 5–10) and succinctly summarised in Giertz (2009: 115–117). 
It is assumed that incomes above a given tax threshold (yx) face a constant effective 
marginal tax rate (t) and the number of taxpayers in the top bracket (N). It is further 
assumed that the average income (ym) reported in the top bracket depends only on 
the marginal net-of-tax rate (1-t), that is, the share of income retained. Behavioural 
responses to marginal tax changes are modelled on the basic labour supply model. 
For tax policy purposes, it is necessary to consider the full impact of tax changes 
on the amount of income generated. There are many ways in which high-income 
individuals will respond to higher rates including working fewer hours, less work 
effort, emigration or choosing another career (see Brewer et al. 2012: 183). The 
response is generally studied using the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) concept.
The ETI concept is central in the analysis to estimate the impact of changes in 
marginal tax rates. It measures the responsiveness of top reported incomes (as a share 
of all reported incomes) with respect to the net-of-tax rate (defined as 1 minus the 
marginal tax rate). If the coefficient is not small, then the implications for tax revenues 
and economic efficiency would be significant. The elasticity (e) is defined as:
e = 1 – t
ym
 ∙  ym
(1–t)
         (1)
The higher the coefficient e, the more responsive tax earnings are to the net-of- 
tax rate. If government increases t by a small amount, it will have two effects on tax 
revenue: a mechanical effect (dM) and a behavioural effect (dB). The mechanical 
effect shows the increase in tax revenue due to the higher tax rate on income and is 
defined as:
dM = N (ym – yx y) dt  (2)
1The behavioural effect reduces tax revenue of the top N taxpayers by:
dB = –N ∙ e ∙ ym  ∙  t
1–t
 dt  (3)
1By combining the two effects, the total change in tax revenue is:
dR = dM + dB
1or
dR= N dt (ym – yx y)∙ [1 – e  ∙ ym
ym–yx y
 ∙  t
1–t
 ]        (4)
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The ratio  can be denoted by a (also referred to as the Pareto parameter)
1and a ≥ 1. In the case of the top income tax bracket (yx), empirical estimates indicate 
that income (within a given year) is approximately Pareto distributed and that the 
coefficient is fairly stable and greater or equal to 1 (Brewer & Brown: 2009: 9; Saez 
2004: 12; Saez et al. 2012: 7). The a parameter also measures the ‘thinness’ of the top 
tail of the income distribution. The thicker the tail of the distribution, the larger ym is 
relative to yx and the smaller is a. Equation 4 can thus be simplified as:
  (5)
The expression in square brackets shows the fraction of tax revenue lost through 
behavioural responses but is also equal to the marginal excess burden (deadweight 
loss) created by the tax increase (Saez 2004: 13). The marginal excess burden (or 
extra utility lost over and above the revenue collected) can be expressed as:
 (6)
Finally, the marginal tax rate that maximises overall tax revenues (sometimes 
called the Laffer bound tax rate) can be obtained from Equation 5. The revenue-
maximising rate (t*) for the top bracket is:
 (7)
If the top rate is set higher than t*, it would be inefficient, since a reduction of the 
rate would not only increase the utility of the high-income taxpayers with income 
above the threshold but also government revenue. Saez (2004: 14) remarks in a 
footnote that if a government has a strong redistributive taste and does not value the 
marginal consumption of the rich, the Laffer rate becomes the optimal rate. This 
is considered to be the upper bound to the top marginal tax rate, and government 
should not exceed this rate. If government has less of a redistributive taste, the rate 
lies between 0 and 1.
The basic model and its focus on the elasticity coefficient have limitations, and 
it can be shown that the reduction in reported income is not only due to reduced 
labour supply, a more generous use of fringe benefits or tax evasion. Saez et al. (2012: 
10–18) and Giertz (2009: 105–111) discuss a number of other parameters that should 
be estimated and also identify issues that complicate estimation. Some of the issues 
include the extent to which the reported income changes are due to income shifting 
(from personal income tax to corporate income tax), timing responses (deferred 
compensation or future legalisation of capital gains), long-run responses (in the 
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case of capital income) and other fiscal externalities such as the consequences of 
these income changes for consumption taxes. Moreover, the elasticity of taxable 
income not only depends on the preferences of taxpayers but how broadly the tax 
base is defined (that is, the tax structure). The more tax deductions, the higher 
the elasticity coefficient. It should also be noted that the responses of taxpayers to 
marginal tax changes may be difficult to estimate, because certain conditions may 
be present that lead them to perceive their tax schedule inaccurately. Liebman and 
Zeckhauser (2004) refer to this as ‘schmeduling’ and list nine conditions (2004: 6–8), 
including the complexity of the tax schedule, which makes it difficult for taxpayers 
to determine their marginal tax rate. Schmeduling leads to ‘ironing’, ‘spotlighting’ 
and ‘ostriching’. Ironing, for example, implies that taxpayers perceive the average tax 
rate as the marginal tax rate, and the welfare implications are that the excess burden 
from higher marginal tax rates is diminished somewhat and the revenue increase is 
greater. Saez (2004: 7) also notes that only large or salient tax changes will generate 
behaviour responses. This is, of course, in contrast with marginal analysis, which 
supposes small tax price changes and underlies much of the modelling work done 
here (see New Zealand Treasury 2009: 3). Saez et al. (2012: 6) also note that because 
the ETI depends on the tax system and individual behaviour, elasticity estimates may 
not apply to a hypothetical large tax change.
The data
1Behavioural responses for different income groups and individuals could probably best 
be analysed using microsimulation models, but since micro-tax data for South Africa 
are confidential, use is made here of published tax data by income group contained in 
Tax Statistics 2011 (National Treasury & SARS 2011). The aim, however, is to make 
only a first attempt at illustrating the revenue responses and efficiency consequences 
of changes in the marginal tax rate as it applies to the top income tax group (the 
rich). Some confidence in this approach stems from the work done by Giertz (2009) 
to analyse tax increases (tax cuts that expired after 2010) in the USA for the higher 
income group. However, a number of qualifications are needed (see Giertz 2009: 
117–121).
It is firstly assumed that the change in the statutory marginal tax rate is the same 
as the change in the effective marginal tax rate. The latter is the more appropriate 
concept to use and differs from the statutory rate because of exemptions, lower 
rates on capital gains, interest income, dividends and social security contributions 
by employers (if this part can be considered as a compulsory cost). In addition, the 
many other indirect taxes such as VAT, excise taxes and user charges could be added, 
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indicating that the effective marginal tax rate on the top 1 per cent of income earners 
is much higher than the current maximum statutory rate of 40 per cent, which is 
applied here as the base rate. Adding the VAT rate would increase the effective tax 
rate to 47.4 per cent [(0.40 + 0.14)/1.14], affect the tax revenue government would 
receive and have efficiency consequences (as will be discussed). It is also assumed 
that the marginal tax rate is constant for incomes in the top bracket.
Secondly, the amount of taxable income and the income tax bracket that applies 
to the top 1 per cent of income tax earners and the tax year need to be determined. 
One option is simply to find the applicable income tax bracket by calculating the 
cumulative shares of the number of taxpayers. Using this method, the approximate 
top 1 per cent of taxpayers (100 000 taxpayers) in 2010 would earn taxable income 
starting at R750 000. It should be realised that taxable income would differ from the 
broader income definition used in the income inequality studies mentioned in the 
earlier section on the distribution of top incomes. To the extent that taxable income 
falls short of gross income, the tax shares would be understated. For example, the 
average income of the top 1 per cent measured using household income data started 
at approximately R400 000 in 2007 (477 000 individuals) and at R560 000 in 2011 
(480 000 individuals) (BMR 2011). Since tabulated taxable income data are only 
available until 2010, this year is used in the estimations in Table 3.
Lastly, the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) is required. As mentioned, the ETI 
measures the responsiveness of reported taxable income to changes in the net-of-
tax rate. This is an important parameter, and its size impacts on tax revenue and 
efficiency – a small ETI has large policy implications and vice versa. Needless to say, 
the coefficients would differ between countries and over time. Empirical evidence 
from the UK and USA show that there is large variation in estimates (see Giertz 2009: 
111–115 for a summary of recent estimates). According to Giertz (2009: 111), the first 
studies reported high estimates (between 1 and 3), whereas more recent estimates are 
closer to 0.4 but still range between 0 and 1. Saez (2004: Table 3) estimates elasticities 
of the top 1 per cent with respect to net-of-tax rates ranging from 1.58 to 0.61 (when 
time trends are included). Saez et al. (2012) conclude that there are no truly convincing 
estimates of long-run elasticity, and that the best estimates range between 0.12 and 
0.40. Using a macro-approach to measuring long-term effects Piketty, Saez and 
Stantcheva (2011: 4) obtained an overall elasticity of 0.5 composed of three elasticities 
at the top income share. Using the so-called ‘difference-in-differences’ methodology 
and time-series data, Brewer, Saez and Shephard (2010: 110) estimated the ETI of 
the richest 1 per cent in the UK at 0.46, which means that a 1 per cent reduction in 
the net-of-tax rate would lead to a 0.46 per cent reduction in taxable income. Claus, 
Creedy and Teng (2010) estimated elasticities for New Zealand and found rates 
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between 0.40 and 1.0 in 1999 (before an increase in the marginal tax rate from 33 
per cent to 39 per cent tax was announced) and rates between 1.3 and 2.3 in 2000 
(before the tax increase was introduced in 2000). Elasticities for the top percentile 
were higher than those for the top decile, confirming results from other studies that 
higher income earners are more responsive to marginal tax rate changes than lower 
income earners. Claus et al. (2010: 15) also found that men are more responsive than 
women to tax rate changes.
In the absence of an elasticity of taxable income estimate for South Africa and 
because tax policy results are so sensitive to different estimates, an average value taken 
from studies of other countries would not suffice. Given the smallness of the tax base, 
the mobility of high-income earners and the various options that the very rich have 
to shift income in South Africa, a relatively high ETI is expected. In addition, there 
is empirical evidence that ETIs tend to be higher for the very rich. Because of the 
uncertainty, the results for an ETI of 0.20, 0.40 and a much higher ETI of 0.80 are 
used to investigate the revenue and efficiency implications of a marginal tax increase 
for the top 1 per cent. Two marginal tax rate increases are considered: an increase 
from 40 per cent to 44 per cent (a rise of 10 per cent) and a similar 10 per cent increase 
assuming an increase in the VAT-inclusive effective marginal tax rate from 47.4 per 
cent to 52.1 per cent.
Revenue and efficiency effects of taxing the very rich at
higher marginal tax rates
1At the outset, it must be recognised that the results obtained are very sensitive 
to the parameters used. The two key terms are the Pareto (a) parameter and the 
elasticity coefficient (e). The latter has already been dealt with earlier in this article. 
The a parameter is calculated in the model for taxpayers (approximately 100 000) 
with income above the top tax threshold (R750 000), with an average income of 
approximately R1.4 million. A coefficient of 2.11 is estimated. This value is comparable 
to an estimate of 1.8 for the UK (Brewer & Browne 2009: 10), 1.6 for New Zealand 
(New Zealand Treasury 2009: 3) and 1.5 for the USA (Saez et al. 2012: 7). As already 
mentioned, the higher the coefficient, the ‘thinner’ the top end of the distribution. If 
the UK value is used, for example, the behavioural response to a tax change would 
be smaller; the marginal excess burden would be less and the efficient top tax rate 
higher.
Table 3 provides revenue and efficiency estimates if the marginal tax rates of very 
rich taxpayers are increased by 10 per cent. Three values of the ETI are used. For 
these different ETIs, the behavioural response to an increase of the marginal tax 
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rate from 40 per cent to 44 per cent would wipe out 28, 56 and 113 per cent of the 
mechanical revenue gain. That would correspond to tax revenue changes ranging 
from gains of approximately R2.0 billion to losses of R340 million. An ETI of 0.4 or 
higher is probably more realistic. Such an ETI would correspond to the estimates by 
Brewer et al. (2010) and Piketty et al. (2011) for the UK and USA, as discussed in a 
previous section. A 10 per cent increase in the marginal tax rate would then result in 
additional tax revenue of only R1.2 billion. The values for the deadweight loss that 
arises from the tax increase are also shown in Table 3. The marginal excess burden 
or efficiency loss associated with an increase of one Rand in revenues can be obtained 
using Equation 6. At an ETI of 0.4, the 10 per cent tax increase results in a marginal 
excess burden of R1.29 (society is worse off by this amount for each extra Rand of tax 
revenue raised).
The cost to society is that much more dramatic when the effective marginal tax 
rate is not 40.0 per cent but 47.4 per cent (the VAT-inclusive rate) (see Jacob, Niemann 
& Weiss 2008 for a more comprehensive measure of effective tax rates). It is expected 
that when reported personal taxable income declines, it must have consequences for 
consumption taxes and should therefore be included in the tax rate used for welfare 
estimations. A 10 per cent increase in the higher effective marginal tax rate results 
not only in comparatively less tax revenue (approximately R270 million against the 
R1.2 billion calculated above) but also in an excess burden of R3.16 for each R1.00 
raised if the ETI is 0.4.
It will be noticed that for an ETI of 0.8, no values for the marginal excess burden 
are recorded. The reason is that the marginal tax rate lies above the revenue-
maximising rate. The Laffer bound rate, which maximises overall tax revenues from 
the very rich, can be obtained using Equation 7. This rate decreases with higher 
elasticity coefficients. Therefore for marginal tax rates higher than 37 per cent in the 
case of an ETI of 0.8, the marginal excess burden ratio would not be relevant.
Much more theoretical and rigorous empirical work is required to determine 
the appropriate marginal tax rate level, but a few pointers could serve to give some 
direction for debate. The level of marginal tax rates would firstly depend on the 
elasticity of taxable income. According to the Laffer bound rates calculated above, 
the efficient marginal tax rate for South Africa ranges between 37 and 70 per cent. 
In more general (theoretical and empirical) terms and based on earlier optimal 
income tax literature and some very specific assumptions about the social welfare 
function to be maximised, Mirrlees (1971) concluded that the optimal income tax 
structure is approximately linear with marginal tax rates between 20 and 30 per cent. 
The findings of Seade (1977) and Sadka (1976) are more extreme and proved that 
marginal tax rates at the highest level of income should be “precisely zero” (quoted
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Table 3:  Revenue and efficiency consequences of increasing the marginal tax rate of 
the top 1 per cent of taxpayers by 10 per cent for South Africa (2010)
Elasticity of taxable income 
(ETI)
0.2 0.4 0.8
Mechanical response (Rm) 2 712 2 712 2 712
Behavioural response (Rm) –763 –1 526 3 052
Change in tax revenue (Rm) 1 949 1 187 –339
Laffer bound tax rate (%) 0.70 0.54 0.37
Marginal excess burden (cents per Rand of revenue) if:
 EMTR increases from 40.0 to 44.0 per cent







Note: EMTR = effective marginal tax rate; N/A = not applicable
Source: Calculated from National Treasury & SARS (2011)
1in Slemrod 1998: 13–22). Slemrod (1998: 17) remarks that the latter result should 
not be taken too seriously as a practical guide but “(i)t highlights the possibility that 
a utilitarian social objective function, even one that places a large weight on the 
welfare of the poor, is not necessarily maximised through high marginal tax rates on 
the rich”.
The disproportionate share of capital income earned by the rich must also be 
factored in when the appropriate level of marginal tax rate at the top incomes is 
analysed. By distinguishing between capital income (interest, dividends, capital 
gains and profits from personal businesses) and labour income (for example, 
wages and salaries), the supporters of the dual income tax regime propose a single 
proportional rate for capital income set equal to the lowest income tax rate (the 
first income tax bracket) on personal (wage) income. Labour income is subject to a 
progressive rate structure and provides for tax deductions and exemptions to achieve 
equity objectives. Overall the taxation of labour income is therefore higher than on 
capital income (see Bird & Zolt 2010; Boadway 2005). In contrast, Matthews (2011: 
29) argues that because tax expenditures and reliefs for capital income benefit the 
rich disproportionately, these should be scaled down if the motive is to raise more 
revenue from the top income recipients.
A final note on marginal tax rates and income inequality is associated with a 
report by Ayres and Edlin (2011) that recently appeared in the New York Times. They 
refer to an eminent American jurist, Louis D. Brandeis, who argued in the early 
twentieth century that at some point the concentration of economic power could 
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undermine the democratic requisites of dispersed political power. In Brandeis’s time, 
huge disparities between the rich and poor led to violent labour unrest and a reform 
movement. Ayres and Edlin (2011) believe that the tipping point beyond which 
income inequality should not be tolerated further can be measured by the ratio of the 
average income of the nation’s richest 1 per cent to the median household income. 
Once the Brandeis ratio exceeds 36 times the after-tax income of this income group 
(the approximate level of income inequality that alarmed Brandeis in his time), an 
automatic extra tax on the rich should kick in. In this manner, inequality is taxed; 
“Billionaires could double their current income without the tax kicking in – as long 
as the median income also doubles. The sky is the limit for the rich as long as the 
‘rising tide lifts all boats’”. This gives the rich (insofar as they are job creators) the 
incentive to make sure that wealth trickles down.
Using the Bureau of Market Research income and expenditure database (BMR 
2010, 2011) and adjusting for inflation, the Brandeis ratio for South Africa was 
approximately 11 in 2011 – the average income of the top 1 per cent was 11 times 
that of the median household income. If it is assumed that this is the tipping point, a 
new tax bracket for the highest 1 per cent of income would be created and a marginal 
income tax rate could be calculated to reduce the after-tax ratio to 11.
Alternatives to taxing the rich at higher rates
1The estimated changes in tax revenue in Table 3 refer to the impact of higher 
marginal tax rates on taxable income. Depending on the values of the elasticity and 
Pareto parameters, the behavioural response of the rich might wipe out any revenue 
gain from a tax increase and might even result in a decrease in revenue. Matthews 
(2011: 28–32) suggests a number of alternatives to increasing marginal tax rates, 
including reducing tax expenditures, reducing tax relief for capital gains, taxing only 
capital income above a ‘normal’ rate of return, or aligning tax rates applicable to 
different types of income (interest, capital gains and dividends) to reduce arbitrage 
(tax shifting) opportunities. These options would apply to income receipts, but could 
be extended to taxing wealth and capital transfers, property taxes and consumption 
(luxury goods and services). The wealth, property and consumption alternatives, 
however, need further analysis and cannot be addressed in this study. Suffice it to 
say that government’s recent introduction of ad valorem taxes on aircraft, helicopters, 
motorboats and sailboats may be indicative of a change in attitude regarding the 
taxation of luxury goods (National Treasury 2012: 58).
The calculations in Table 3 refer to taxable income. Once actual revenue collections 
are considered, the revenue outcomes from marginal tax increases might be even 
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more disappointing. A percentage of 91.6 of assessed taxpayers (with taxable income 
greater than R750 000) generated R50.4 billion in revenue on taxable income of 
R143.0 billion in 2010, that is, at an effective average rate of 35.2 per cent. One option 
to increase the average tax rate without affecting the marginal tax rate would be to 
reduce tax expenditures utilised by the rich (untaxed fringe benefits, exempt interest 
and dividends, medical and retirement deductions and rebates). The rich (taxable) 
income group utilised fringe benefits and deductions to the tune of approximately 
R12.5 billion in 2010. In Table 4, a selected group of tax expenditures used by 
the rich have been identified. Glaring examples of the disproportionate claiming 
of fringe benefits and deductions are the acquisition of assets below actual value 
and commission-related expenses. Thus by clamping down on tax expenditures or 
capping the amounts that can be claimed, the taxable income base can be broadened 
further.
Table 4:  Selected tax expenditures utilised by the income group with taxable income 










Share of total 
assessed 
amount (%)
Fringe benefits – acquisition of asset 
at less than the actual value 32 473 1 687 2.15 13.58
Deductions – current pension fund 
contributions 36 207 1 743 1.55 3.92
Deductions – current retirement 
annuity fund contributions 56 703 2 318 1.67 8.24
Deductions – other expenses related 
to commission income 7 036 922 2.26 13.53
Source: Calculated from National Treasury & SARS (2011)
Areas where the rich are favoured in particular are the tax treatment of capital 
gains, share options and dividend income. As large holders of assets, the rich, 
very rich and super-rich earn proportionally more from these sources of income. 
Approximately 50 per cent of the allowance for share options were exercised by the 
5.7 per cent of taxpayers who recorded taxable income above R750 000 in 2010. This 
could be indicative of the extent to which rich executives and professionals use this 
form of compensation as a loophole.
A somewhat different approach focuses on the process of income and wealth 
generation. The debate is then invariably about the economic virtues of the rich (the 
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positive externalities they create such as savings, investment, support for cultural 
activities, risk-taking and innovation) and the importance of fairness in the process of 
income generation (see Slemrod 1998). In respect of the savings behaviour of the rich, 
Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2000: 32) observed that there is still much to be learned 
but are convinced that the rich do indeed save more. On the issue of fairness, Nozick 
(1974) argues that if ‘things’ are obtained in a just manner, there is no justification 
for redistribution. ‘Things’ refers to capital and property which the rich, of course, 
hold in abundance. There is considerable variation in perspectives on the role of the 
rich in economic development, including the views of Max Weber and his followers 
(‘the Protestant work ethic’) and those of social Darwinists (‘survival of the richest’). 
It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss these views, but there is certainly much 
disagreement – see for example De Long (1989) on the relationship between a strong 
(Protestant or cultural) work ethic and the role of the rich entrepreneurial class to 
accumulate. Also recognising the importance of processes or institutions, Miron 
(2011), in his response to Warren Buffet’s assertion that the super-rich do not pay 
enough taxes, calls for a review of the rules and policies that favour the better off 
(for example, favouritism, political connections, and restrictive examinations and 
other barriers to entry into the professions that artificially restrict the supply of these 
services).
It is apparent that National Treasury is acutely aware of the alternatives to higher 
marginal tax rates. In the 2012 Budget Review (National Treasury 2012: 50–52, 
187), a number of reforms were introduced or announced that have the effect of 
broadening the personal income tax base and taxing capital income more fairly, 
including the conversion of medical expenses to tax credits, increases in effective 
capital gains tax rates, the implementation of a dividend withholding tax, the capping 
of annual deductions for retirement contributions and the review of the various types 
of employee share schemes.
Conclusion
1The distribution of aggregate income in South Africa is skew, and inequality did 
not improve between 1993 and 2008. In concert with other Anglo-Saxon countries 
and developing countries, the incomes of the top income groups have become less 
concentrated for most of the twentieth century. However, when the distribution 
within the top 1 per cent since 1980 is viewed, the inverted Pareto-Lorenz coefficients 
show that in all the countries there is growing concentration. In comparison with 
this selection of countries, concentration within the top 1 per cent of income in South 
Africa does not rank particularly high. There was nevertheless an increase in the 
T.J. Steenekamp
24 
share of the top 1 per cent in the last decade. Globally this led to concern and calls 
for higher taxes on this group.
To get some understanding of the constraints of using taxes to change the 
distribution of income in South Africa, a simple inter-country comparison shows 
that the average tax burden (excluding social security contributions) of 21.6 per cent 
of GDP is higher than in a selected group of developed and developing countries. 
Also the share of personal income tax (excluding SSC) generally exceeds that of 
DCs and LDCs. Further exploiting the tax system for revenue and distributional 
purposes might well establish South Africa as a high tax country, with detrimental 
consequences for growth and stability (in that taxpayer tolerance would be tested). 
Taxpayers’ discomfort with higher tax rates to finance pro-poor policies is aptly 
illustrated by Seekings (2005), who shows that support for redistribution is far from 
unconditional. It is, however, not just the levels and composition of taxes that matter 
for redistribution purposes. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence on the overall 
impact of taxation on reducing inequality in South Africa is not very encouraging. 
Moreover, there is evidence that the tax effort in respect of personal income tax is 
already at a high level compared to other developing countries. This indeed calls into 
question the prospects for targeting personal income taxation and the rich.
Taxing the rich leads to behavioural responses that impact on revenue and 
economic efficiency. Using different elasticity of taxable income (ETI) coefficients, 
it was estimated that a 10 per cent increase in the top marginal tax rate would result 
in taxable income ranging from a gain of approximately R2 billion to losses of R340 
million. Although these results are tentative, they show that taxing the rich at higher 
rates may not produce the revenue windfall expected. The marginal excess burden 
increases from R0.39 to R3.16, depending on the ETI and effective marginal tax 
rate, which also raises doubts regarding the economic efficiency of increasing tax 
rates. If government has a strong redistributive taste and does not value the marginal 
consumption of the rich, it can be concluded that the rich should indeed pay more 
tax but that marginal tax rates should not go up (Economist 2012a). There are also 
alternatives to raising marginal tax rates such as reducing tax expenditures that are 
disproportionately utilised by the rich and taxing the process whereby the rich become 
rich. The implication in this case may well be to stop squeezing the rich (Economist 
2012b) and instead soak the rich (Dalmia 2011) by inter alia reducing marginal tax 
rates on capital income. This could be a step closer to a dual income tax system.
Finally, a brief incursion was made into measuring the tipping point beyond 
which income inequality will not be tolerated further (the Brandeis ratio). What 
the appropriate ratio for South Africa is or should be, and whether it is practical and 
feasible to implement such a cap on high-income earners, are moot points. However, 
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the stage must surely be reached where huge and rising income inequalities will 
threaten democracy. This view would not be too far removed from that of Meltzer 
and Richard (1981), who argued that once the income of the median voter lies below 
the average income, there would be pressure for redistribution. The Brandeis ratio 
could then, in principle, be employed to check further deviation of the average from 
the mean, but always cognisant of the positive and negative incentive effects and 
other behavioural responses if the rich are taxed at higher rates.
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Endnotes
1 Tax revenue data are for central government only since such data are not available for 
the general government for all SADC countries.
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